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INTRODUCTION 
The essence of the 'new issues' raised by Respondent Department 
of Commerce and Labor (DOL) are the same as raised by Appellant 
Henderson. The rewording of the respective issues casts them in a light that 
DOL believes is favorable to it. The results are the same regardless. This 
Reply Brief will endeavor to avoid repetition of argument. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
DOL misstates a portion of the course below at pages 1 and 2 of 
it's brief. It states that "Based upon new information she received, Ms. 
Ackerman changed the Department's work search classification" and cites to 
a portion of the Hearing transcript. 
This is not a correct statement. 
Ms. Ackerman did not change anything based upon 'new 
information' she received. Pages 22 and 23 of the hearing transcript reflect 
that it was a computer issue because of the changed program. She testified 
that the way the computer system was "unfortunately" set up on the 'current 
sequence' she was coded as a B2. She further explained that although the 
computer listed Henderson as a B2 that in fact Henderson, in all 3 series is 
considered to be job attached. The standard applicable to Henderson, as 
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explained by Ms. Ackerman, in all three 3 claims, was and remained at all 
times, 'job attached.' 
Additionally, DOL states that the claimant changed her mailing 
address from St. Maries to Hawaii. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Actually as 
explained by Ms. Ackerman, the actual change of address on the computer 
was done by a staff member, for Henderson. Hr. T. p. 9, L. 12-16. 
Finally it is inferred that Henderson 'redacted' information from 
the Appendix. Respondent's Brief p. 5. 'Redacted' generally refers to 
information blocked out by magic marker. The pages relevant to the appeal 
were put in rather than inundating the Court with numerous pages of fire 
starter. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUrnNT NO. 1 
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S NO. 2 
ELIGIBILITY UNDER LC. SECTION 72-1366(4)(a)(b) 
The statutory requirement established by the Legislature for 
eligibility for unemployment benefits is set forth at I.C. section 72-1366 (4) 
(a) and (b). 
No where in subsections (a) andlor (b) is there any statement of 
intent that a 'job attached' employee (or a non-attached employee) "must 
remain at all times in their respective labor market area." Indeed the clear 
and unequivocal requirement is not that a claimant must live in their 
'respective labor market' but rather the requirement is that the person must 
reside in a state that is included in the interstate benejitplan. There is no 
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dispute that Hawaii is a state and that it is included in the interstate benefit 
plan program. 
DOL attempts to support the untenable position taken by Ms. 
Ackerman the DOL representative at the hearing and the one involved in the 
initiating of the process, that Henderson was 'not available for work,' 
because she could not be at work in an hour or even the very next day. She 
testified that her understanding of the requirement was, 
"...available for work in an hour or even the very next day." 
Hk. T. p. 11, L. 15-17. 
The standard despite the DOL argument contrary to the express 
wording of the statute is not that a person must sit by the telephone, with car 
running, just in case the highly unlikely and improbable telephone call may 
come and tell the 'attached' employee to be at work in an hour, or even the 
very next day. Real life in 'seasonal' jobs does not work that way. Indeed the 
only requirement, even under Ms. Ackerman's interpretation that Henderson 
could not meet was to be at work in a hour. As Henderson testified, she could 
have been back to be ready for work within 5 hours and certainly within 24 
hours after her receipt of a telephone call. Hr. T. p. 14, L.4-5. 
A standard that would require a 'seasonal' employee to be back at 
work within an hour would be patently unreasonable. In the winter, the 'off- 
season' a person could not drive from St. Maries to Coeur d'Alene, let alone 
Spokane, because it takes at least an hour-on a good day with clear roads to 
travel back from Coeur dYAlene to St. Maries, let alone get work clothes on 
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and then make it to the place of business or job site location. Certainly reason 
must prevail at some point, and under the most extreme circumstances it is 
not unreasonable to allow a 'seasonal' employee on 'lay-off at least 24 
hours notice to allow them to get their affairs in order and be at work. Under 
that reasonable requirement, Henderson is undisputedly qualified. 
DOL attempts to support it's argument with two 'non-job attached' 
cases (Claim of Sapp, 75 Idaho 65, 266 P.2d 1027 (1954) and Kirkbride v. 
Department of Employment, 91 Idaho 658, 429 P.2d 390 (1967)). The 
Industrial Commission, from whence this appeal arises, did not believe that 
these two cases were relevant. If it had, it would not have reached out to 
Florida and California for the cases it relied upon for support. Indeed, the 
status of a 'job attached' employee is far different than the status of a 'non- 
attached' employee. This difference is steeped in sound public policy that 
Idaho's seasonal employers must be able to count upon a returning skilled 
workforce in order to compete in the marketplace. 
At page 16 of it's brief, DOL, pulls the curtain back and reveals that 
it's argument, and actually the position taken by the Industrial Commission, 
is based simply on the fact that Henderson spent her 'lay-of? time as a 'job 
attached' employee, in Hawaii. 
As the DOL argued, 
"Wintering in Hawaii is not the sort of compelling personal 
circumstance for which the California Court or Idaho law 
could make an allowance." Respondent's Brief, p. 16. 
REPLY BRIEF OF HENDERSON 6 
As the Industrial Commission held, 
"We note that no one forced Claimant to seek unemployment 
benefits while she spent her winters in Hawaii. Claimant did 
so on her own free will." R. p. 22. 
Obviously, the state in which 'job attached' claimant lives during 
the seasonal lay-off should have no impact on eligibility so long as the 
person can return to work in a reasonable time frame, after notice to do so, 
and so long as the state is an 'interstate' participant. Henderson's living in 
Hawaii during the seasonal lay-off meets all of those requirements. Would 
wintering in Northern Minnesota, North Dakota, or Northern Wisconsin be 
more palatable from a personal circumstance point of view? These are all 
states under I.C. section 72-1366(4) and their respective winters really put 
the 'winter' into wintering. Should they be? Obviously, the answer to these 
rhetorical questions should be no. So long as the person is 'job attached', 
capable of returning to work within a reasonable time after notice, and living 
in an 'interstate' state, the person should be entitled to the unemployment 
benefits. 
The facts are undisputed that Henderson was job attached, could 
have and was ready to return to work upon very short and reasonable notice, 
and was residing in an interstate benefit state. Henderson meets the 
requirements of I.C. section 72-1366 (4) (a) and (b). 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT NO. I1 
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S ARGUMENT 4 
REGARDING WAIVER UNDER I.C. SECTION 72-1369(5)(a) 
DOL's argument regarding 'waiver' in response to Henderson's 
reason for answering the reporting question in the manner in which she was 
told is, essentially, as reflected at page 27, L. 15-17 of the Hr. T., 
"And I do want to say that as manager of the local office 
we never instruct our claimant to falsifjr on a weekly report 
when they file their claim." 
Truth or falseness are not issues in this case. Both the Hearing 
Examiner and the Industrial Commission found that Henderson's receipt of 
unemployment benefit payments were "not the result of a false statement or 
misrepresentation made by Claimant." T. p.6. If Henderson's reports were 
not false nor misrepresentations then by definition they must have been true 
and made with no intent to deceive or be unfair. 
Henderson testified that she was told how to answer the question 
by the DOL local representative when she notified them to change her 
address for her from St. Maries to Hawaii. Henderson also testified that she 
based her answer to the question upon what she thought that the question 
meant. She answered the same question consistently the same for the same 
reasons. Since it was a finding of act that Henderson did not make a 'false 
statement or misrepresentation' it is likewise true, and consistent with Ms. 
Ackerman's testimony, that she was not instructed by DOL staff to falsify 
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her answers on a report. Neither of the two, (1) what she was told to do 
when answering, and (2) what she answered, are untrue, false or 
misrepresentations. 
Given the express finding that Henderson did not falsify or 
misrepresent it is difficult to appreciate how she could be deemed at fault for 
giving an answer that she felt was correct, that she has given consistently 
over the years, and that she was told to give. It is also disconcerting, given 
this finding of fact of no falsity or misrepresentation, that the Hearing 
Examiner and the Industrial Commission by inference could adopt a position 
that the "only accurate answer" that Henderson could have given was not the 
one that she gave. Certainly if it were truly the " only " accurate answer 
Henderson's giving of a different answer, such as she did, would be 
falsifying or misrepresenting on it's face. 
With regards to the Industrial Commission it wasn't a question of 
credibility as DOL argues in its brief, at page 22. Rather the Industrial 
Commission refused the waiver for the novel reason that Henderson went to 
Hawaii. The Industrial Commission held on this point, "no one forced 
Claimant to seek unemployment benefits while she spent her winters in 
Hawaii. Claimant did so on her own ftee will. Therefore Claimant is entirely 
responsible for the information she provided when she sought those 
benefits." R. p. 22. The Industrial Commissions holding that Henderson 
went to Hawaii while laid off makes any error solely of her own doing , after 
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Henderson reported her change of address to the DOL local office who 
changed it for her on the computer, and when Henderson responded to the 
weekly reporting questions in exactly the manner that she was told by the 
local DOL representative to do, is untenable. There is no showing how 
Henderson going to Hawaii makes her culpable for any perceived wrong 
answer especially in light of the undisputed facts of this case. Indeed, while 
Ms. Ackerman the local manager testified that her office does not instruct 
claimants to falsify reports, the fact is that the DOL could have produced the 
person who changed Henderson's address on the computer and told her how 
to fill out the weekly reporting form, but it failed to do so and failed to 
contradict Henderson's testimony, which given the finding of no falsity or 
misrepresentation is not rebutted. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT I11 
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S 
ARGUMENT 1-JURISDICTION 
The Court will consider a question of jurisdiction on appeal. The 
statutory requirements governing appeals are mandatory and jurisdictional. 
Lujkin v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 584, 602 P.2d 947 (1979); 
Dunlap v. Cassia Memorial Hospital Medical Center, 134 Idaho 233, 999 
P.2d 888 (2000). 
DOL argues that either (1) no determination of eligibility was ever 
made on Henderson's unemployment claims for December 12,2004 through 
February 26,2005 or December 4,2005 through April 1,2006, during which 
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Henderson received unemployment benefits, or (2) that each weekly report 
results in a new determination and is a new event that triggers a new appeal 
time or statute of limitations. It is difficult to conceive that no determination 
of eligibility was ever made on Henderson's claims during these two periods 
of time, although payments were made to her, and that a 'determination' can 
be made without the presence of a non-disclosure or a misrepresentation at 
any subsequent time. 
Nonetheless, even under DOL's argument the March 30,2007 
'determination' with regards to the weekly claim reporting periods of 
December 12,2004 through February 26,2005 are all outside of the I.C. 
section 72-1368(3), 14 day appeal time. They are also outside of the one (1) 
year "special redetermination" (which by definition implies that a 
determination has been already made) time period. With regards to the 
weekly claim reporting periods from December 4,2005 through April 1, 
2006, all weekly periods, except the last three of March 12th through March 
31" are also outside the 14 day appeal period and outside the one (1) year 
"special redetermination" period of time. Beyond these three week reporting 
periods, under DOL's own argument there would be no jurisdiction in the 
DOL or the Industrial Commission because there is no allegation, nor 
finding, of nondisclosure nor misrepresentation involved. The DOL does use 
terms in this argument, and elsewhere in it's brief, such as "failed to report 
accurately" and "answers to this question were inaccurate." However the 
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express finding of fact by the Hearings Examiner and adopted by the 
Industrial Commission was that the "overpayment was not the result of a 
false statement or misrepresentation made by claimant." R. p. 6. 
At most, even under DOL's proposed analysis, only three (3) weeks 
of benefits in the total amount of $975.00 would be at issue on this appeal. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT IV 
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S 
ARGUMENT 3-IDAPA 
The gravaman of the issue raised by Henderson during the entire 
length of her pro se, and now represented, journey through this nightmare she 
tried so hard to avoid, is the question of her entitlement to unemployment 
benefits pursuant to I.C. section 72-1 366(4)(a) and (b). The validity of 
IDAPA 09.0 1.30.175.04.23 is inherently a part of that question. The Court 
will no more enforce an illegal transaction than it will enforce a regulation 
that in effect rewrites a clear and unambiguous statute. Moses v. Idaho State 
Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 799 P.2d 964 (1990). The validity of the 
IDAPA rule was raised by Henderson's responses to DOL's action below and 
her appeal to the Industrial Commission which placed the rule squarely at 
issue. 
I.C. section 72-1366(4)(b) clearly and unequivocally provides that 
she must (and) live in a state that is included in the interstate benefit plan. 
There is no dispute that Hawaii is such a state and indeed that is how 
Henderson processed her last claims was through that plan. Subsection (b) 
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makes no mention whatsoever about any requirement that a claimant live in 
the state of Idaho, let alone the even more restrictive "local labor market." 
The statute clearly uses the wording "a state". 
DOL argues that the 'intent' is to require that a person be 
"genuinely attached to a labor market," and that IDAPA 09.01.30.175.23 is 
the DOL7s attempt to insure that attachment. What this argument does not 
take into account is the undisputed finding of fact that Henderson was 
classified as '"jb attached" to her respective specific employer, and returned 
to her respective "attached" employer each and every time. R. p. 2-3. 
It is difficult to conceive of how a person could be more "attached 
to a labor market" than to be a "job attached" employee who returns 
regularly each year to the respective employer. IDAPA may be a good faith 
effort to insure that "non-job attached" workers remain genuinely attached to 
the labor market, but that intent can not run afoul of the clear statutory 
language and, in Henderson's specific situation, the undisputed finding of 
fact of her strong attachment to the labor market as a "job attached" worker, 
who only needs to remain in contact with hisher respective and specific 
employer. 
Henderson was "attached" as closely to her labor market at all times 
as any unemployed worker could possibly be as a "job attached" employee, 
and she lived at all times in "a state .... that is included in the interstate benefit 
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payment plan." Henderson not only meets the letter of the law but the intent 
of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The DOL's arguments, if anything, serve to strength and galvanize 
the position of Henderson that she at all times fully complied with statutory 
requirements to receive unemployment benefits. Her situation represents the 
practicalities of the inherent need of Idaho's many seasonal employers to 
maintain a skilled workforce and the practicalities of a "job attached" 
employee. Henderson's consistent history of seasonal lay-off and then return 
to work to the respective "job attached" employer when called and her ability 
to return to that respective employer on the most minimal of reasonable 
notice are reflective that the system as designed by the Idaho Legislature 
works as it was intended. The Court should reverse the Decision of the 
Industrial Commission. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMJJXED, n this &day of March, 2008. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Henderson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &day of March, 2008,I caused to be 
served two true and correct copies of the foregoing by First Class Postage via 
the United States Post Office to 
Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor 
3 17 Main Street 
Boise, Idaho ,-83735 
F, 
Starr Kelso 
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